I argue that marking a proper distinction between two types of research in the cybersecurity field obviates the present debate concerning a ''science of cybersecurity.'' Once the terminology has been properly disambiguated, the accurate descriptor for the current state of the practice of cybersecurity becomes apparent: it is a protoscience. Further, once a definition for 'science' is specified, it becomes clear that the protoscientific state is capable of trending in the proper direction, namely toward science and away from pseudoscience.
Introduction
In a recent publication, Alexander Kott notes that ''the central role of models in science is well recognized; it can be argued that a science is a collection of models, or that a scientific theory is a family of models or a generalized schema for models.'' (Kott, 1 p. 30). Although there are alternative proposed solutions to the demarcation problem, taking Kott's model-based approach to defining science affords the opportunity to address-and make progress toward solving-the recent debate concerning a potential ''science of cybersecurity. '' i Kott references the debate in terms of a lacuna in our present categorization of cybersecurity research: even for those in the cyber security community who agree with the need for a science of cyber-whether it merits an exalted title of a new science or should be seen merely as a distinct field of research within one or more of [the] established sciences-the exact nature of the new science, its scope and boundaries remain rather unclear. (Kott, 1 p. 1)
Kott's statements provide the backdrop for two tasks, both of which I aim to accomplish here. The first is to articulate, in an accessible fashion, a disambiguation of the phrase ''science of cybersecurity.'' Doing so addresses Kott's query about the scope of a science of cybersecurity. The second task is a consequence of the first: it is an assessment of the current state of the practice of cybersecurity in terms of whether it is, or can be, scientific.
I argue that marking a proper distinction between two types of research in the cybersecurity field obviates the present debate concerning a science of cybersecurity. Once the terminology has been properly disambiguated, the accurate descriptor for the current state of the practice of cybersecurity becomes apparent: it is a protoscience. Further, if we adopt a definition for ''science'' in line with the one chosen by Kott, we can see that the protoscientific state is capable of trending in the proper direction: toward science and away from pseudoscience.
Section 2 is spent identifying the distinction between the referents of the terms cybersecurity and science of cybersecurity. With that distinction in place, Section 3 proceeds with an analysis of the present state of ''cybersecurity'' and ''science of cybersecurity,'' with the aim of establishing that cybersecurity is protoscientific. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. of some entity from an adversary's attempts to meddle with those assets in some way. The ''defending'' can take many forms, including straightforwardly responding to attacks, preemptively researching human motivational and game theoretic tendencies to anticipate the actions of attackers, or deciding what actions to take upon gaining knowledge of an as-yet-unexploited vulnerability.
ii When we refer to cybersecurity, we refer to actions of this sortto the practice of cybersecurity. Accordingly, in what follows, I will utilize the term practice of cybersecurity, denoted cybersecurity p , when referring to the act of cybersecurity itself.
By contrast, is it clear that cybersecurity p is distinct from the (potential) science of cybersecurity, hereafter denoted cybersecurity s . This is so because the science of cybersecurity-cybersecurity s -refers to the collective properties of cybersecurity p , such as its methods, principles, and laws.
iii These properties emerge from an analysis of cybersecurity p discipline-wide; individual instances of cybersecurity p do not reveal such collective qualities. The different denotation of each of the two terms is the first of three clear indicators that cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s are distinct in terms of their research subject matter.
The second indicator arises from the traditional scope of scientific research. The distinction between cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s fits the landscape of ''traditional'' sciences. Consider physics, for example. Physicists do physics: they generate theories, they think of clever ways to test the theories, and they experiment to instantiate the clever tests. Additionally, however, there is a set of people who study what the physicists do, how the physicists operate, and what the implications are of what the physicists are reporting. These people-philosophers of physicsstudy the way the practice of physics is undertaken, as well as the implications of the discoveries of the physicists. The philosophers of physics focus on experimental method, the epistemological foundations that ground the claims of the physicists, and the like. There are other groups of this sort for other sciences, too: philosophers of biology, philosophers of cosmology, and so forth. Collectively, the group comprises the philosophy of science field. Sometimes, the scientists themselves are also philosophers of their respective sciences, but those cases are fairly rare. By and large, but not exclusively, a researcher of the sort under discussion here is chiefly a scientist (a physicist, a biologist, a cosmologist, etc.) or chiefly a philosopher of science. Correspondingly, the distinction between cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s fits this structure: cybersecurity p researchers correspond to the scientists, and cybersecurity s researchers correspond to the philosophers of science. In that sense, cybersecurity s could instead be labeled ''philosophy of cybersecurity. '' iv The third indicator that cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s are distinct fields of research is that the distinction enables the evaluative element of science to arise for cybersecurity. Just as the physicist could do physics research either scientifically or unscientifically, so, too, a cybersecurity p researcher is capable of undertaking cybersecurity p research scientifically or unscientifically. v Note, importantly, that in both cases, the scientist still undertakes the ''base'' activity: the physicist still undertakes physics, and the cybersecurity p researcher still undertakes cybersecurity p research, regardless of whether the research is done scientifically or unscientifically. Neither researcher undertakes the philosophical task: the physicist (in the example) is not undertaking philosophy of physics while performing physics research, and the cybersecurity p researcher is not undertaking cybersecurity s research while performing cybersecurity p research. These are different fields, with different targets of study. The same separation holds true for the evaluation of the research, as well: the cybersecurity p researcher, regardless of whether he or she does the work scientifically or not, still does not undertake cybersecurity s research. If we fail to distinguish cybersecurity p from cybersecurity s , we are left only with ''cybersecurity research'' as a singular bulk entity, and our hunt for a ''science of cybersecurity'' reduces to the oversimplification of attempting to judge whether cybersecurity research as a whole is scientific. No unifying answer will surface from that inquiry (indeed, none has thus far), chiefly because that task is ambiguous. To disambiguate the task, we need the capability to evaluate cybersecurity p research and distinguish scientific cybersecurity p research from unscientific cybersecurity p research. Cybersecurity s research is what provides the tools for making that evaluation.
Two small tangent discussions involving the qualities of cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p are in order before proceeding. vi The first involves defining the members of the group labeled ''cybersecurity p researchers.'' The uniqueness of the computing discipline blurs the line that separates engineers and scientists in that domain.
vii The blurring introduces a potential complication: insofar as the narrative thus far has correlated cybersecurity p researchers with ''scientists,'' it is unclear (for example) whether industry software engineers are scientists-cybersecurity p researchers-in the same way that university computer science department faculty members are scientists. In the present context, the complication is sidestepped by recognizing that it is not a researcher's role that invokes the ''cybersecurity p '' label, but rather it is the researcher's action that invokes the label. So long as a researcher is engaged with the activity of defending technological assets (broadly construed, as discussed at the outset of this section), that researcher (for present purposes) is undertaking cybersecurity p research at that time. Put another way, cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s are areas of research, rather than classificatory roles, so specific roles-software engineer, faculty member, etc.-cannot be intrinsically linked to cybersecurity p (or cybersecurity s ). Just as the same person might, at one time, undertake experimental physics research (as a scientist) and might, at another time, undertake a study of the metaphysical implications of that experimental physics research (as a philosopher of physics), so, too, an industry software engineer (or a university faculty member) might undertake cybersecurity p research at one time and cybersecurity s research at another time. The subject matter, not the researcher's role, delineates cybersecurity p from cybersecurity s .
Second, with respect to the domains of the two fields, the inherent adversarial nature of cybersecurity p reveals an interesting difference between its output and the output of some of the traditional sciences to which it has been analogized thus far. Because cybersecurity p researchers operate within a dynamic (adversarial) environment, the results of their research often are rendered obsolete by their adversaries. Accordingly, cybersecurity p researchers must frequently revisit (and revise) previously-obtained results. Traditional scientists (physicists, for example) face no such dynamic environments. The results obtained by those scientists (assuming the results are veridical) remain valid and can be built upon, so the need rarely arises to return to square one. This distinction potentially explains an apparent mismatch between traditional scientists and cybersecurity p researchers. Whereas traditional scientists are able to proceed, as part of the traditional scientific trajectory, from obtaining their results to interpreting them (for example, by attempting to generate laws to describe large swaths of results), cybersecurity p researchers instead must contend with adversarial actions that render obsolete their previously-obtained results. viii In these cases, tasks (such as the foundational unification of data and results into lawlike generalities) that would normally be undertaken by scientists (cybersecurity p researchers) fall instead into the domain of cybersecurity s researchers.
Because cybersecurity p is in a nascent state, it is only beginning to develop its own set of researchers focused on cybersecurity s . At this early stage, the cybersecurity s literature arises mainly from a select few researchers in cybersecurity p who branch out with the occasional publication addressing cybersecurity s . Examples of this sort include Roy Maxion (with his focus on experimental practice in cybersecurity p ), Fred Schneider (with his focus on urging cybersecurity p researchers to search for potential scientific laws of cybersecurity p ), and Alexander Kott (with his approach to defining science and evaluating the fit between that definition and cybersecurity p ). 1, 11, 12 Although the bulk of the work done by these researchers lies in the cybersecurity p domain, they address cybersecurity s when they study the way cybersecurity p is undertaken.
Although cybersecurity s could be referred to by a different label (perhaps, as suggested earlier, 'philosophy of cybersecurity'), it has instead received the ambiguous label 'science of cybersecurity', which has generated the confusion that the present work is aiming (in part) to disentangle. Indeed, the distinction between cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s has, in fact, been identified in several places in the literature. For example, the abstract to the 2010 JASON report opens by stating:
JASON was requested by the DoD to examine the theory and practice of cyber-security, and evaluate whether there are underlying fundamental principles that would make it possible to adopt a more scientific approach, identify what is needed in creating a science of cyber-security, and recommend specific ways in which scientific methods can be applied. (JASON, In the present terminology, JASON was contracted to investigate cybersecurity p to determine whether cybersecurity s could be developed. The following year, the US Government issued its strategic plan for cybersecurity research, in which it is noted that ''the science of security has the potential of producing universal laws that are predictive and transcend specific systems, attacks, and defenses.'' (Executive Office of the President, 14 p. 11). It is not cybersecurity p that would produce the universal laws; rather, cybersecurity s would generate the laws that would thereby facilitate a higher level of success for cybersecurity p .
ix Nonetheless, in the years since, the debate concerning the ''science of cybersecurity'' has devolved due to the loss of keeping the referents of cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p distinct from each other. To illustrate, I will close this section with a clear, extended example of the field's deep-rooted conflation of cybersecurity s with cybersecurity p . Although what follows is merely a single episode, it accurately exemplifies the lack of the distinction between cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p in the cybersecurity field.
In a two-issue burst in 2012, the National Security Agency's The Next Wave periodical covered the subjects of ''Developing a blueprint for a science of cybersecurity'' 15 and ''Building a national program for cybersecurity science.'' 16 The titles of the two issues suggest an emphasis on cybersecurity s , but the contents of the issues instead reflect a decidedly even mixture of pieces focused on cybersecurity p and pieces focused on cybersecurity s .
Then, in 2015, The Next Wave revisited the topic with its issue entitled ''Building a Science of Cybersecurity: The Next Move. '' 17 In that issue, the same mixture of cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p contributions emerges. However, the Guest Editor's Column that opens the publication, penned by Stuart Krohn, offers hope that the distinction between cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s has taken root. Krohn identifies several important cybersecurity s foci in the column, particularly when he writes: The mention of Popper, Duhem, and Kuhn, all of whom are renowned philosophers of science, highlights the earlier-articulated relationship between philosophers of science and cybersecurity s researchers. The inclusion of those philosophers of science in the discussion appears to bode well for the establishment of the distinction between cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p . However, what follows the ellipsis in the quote above reveals that cybersecurity s and cybersecurity p are, instead, viewed as interchangeably as they ever have been: ''.but that is not our interest here.'' (Krohn, 17 p. i). Krohn then describes the contents of the issue, which is dedicated to ''the next move'' in ''building a science of cybersecurity'':
This issue of TNW describes research contributing to the development of security science. Included are highlights of two workshops initiated by the Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering subcommittee: one on the adoption of cybersecurity technology, the other on computational cybersecurity in compromised environments.. Interspersed are several more in-depth papers on topics including power grid security, phishing, privacy, cyber-physical systems, and a competition aimed at building better code. (Krohn, 17 p. i)
Despite directly distinguishing cybersecurity s research and accurately identifying it as the philosophy of science correlate to cybersecurity p , Krohn proceeds to conflate cybersecurity s with cybersecurity p by classifying material that unambiguously falls under cybersecurity p as ''research contributing to the development of security science.'' The result is that the issue dedicated to building a science of cybersecurity-dedicated to cybersecurity s research of the sort initially mentioned by Krohn in his column-instead is filled with cybersecurity p research.
We see, then, that when one inquires whether there can be a ''science of cybersecurity,'' there are two significant questions being asked simultaneously:
''Can cybersecurity p be scientific?'' ''Can cybersecurity s exist?'' The ''debate'' about the issue arises when discussants intend to address one interpretation of the question without acknowledging which interpretation is intended. By distinguishing cybersecurity p from cybersecurity s , we are able to navigate the ambiguity.
Cybersecurity as protoscience
Karl Popper notes that ''science must begin with mythsand with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices.'' (Popper, 18 p. 177). This longer view of scientific development involves the protoscientific state, which comes before the transition to fully-fledged science. x Popper places observational models and experimental design chronologically after the protoscientific stage because those are precisely the qualities that he deems necessary for scientific status. He frames those qualities in terms of falsifiability: a theory qualifies as a scientific theory if it is falsifiable, which means that it makes testable predictions that would render the theory false if actually observed. From this protoscientific state, two possible trajectories follow. On one trajectory, the protoscience could develop the observation-gathering, experiment-designing, model-based capabilities cited by Popper and Kott as the requisite qualities for genuine science. On the other trajectory, the protoscience could remain in the myth-criticizing state whereby its techniques and practices are neither fundamentally understood nor rigorously reliable. This latter type of development is one from protoscience to pseudoscience. xiii Distinguishing cybersecurity p from cybersecurity s leaves us in position to ascertain where cybersecurity p rests on the trajectory of scientific development. More specifically, because classifying cybersecurity p is a task that lies under the purview of philosophy of science, we see that assessing the scientificity of cybersecurity p is a cybersecurity s task. xiv The argumentation contained in the previous section, then, can be put to work to indicate whether cybersecurity p is scientific. It will be cybersecurity s , particularly with respect to its overlap with philosophy of science, that will provide answers about whether cybersecurity p is scientific.
In fact, there is a very clear sense in which the ''science of cybersecurity'' case is an ideal candidate for adjudication via the philosophy of science literature. Sven Ove Hansson characterizes the denotation of our use of the word 'science' as follows:
It [our usage of the term 'science'] can focus on the descriptive contents, and specify how the term is actually used.
Alternatively, it can focus on the normative element, and clarify the more fundamental meaning of the term. The latter approach has been the choice of most philosophers writing on the subject. (Hansson, 8 p. 4) We see (from the material presented in Section 2) that the cybersecurity literature currently conflates the two possible denotations-cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s -of our usage of the 'science of cybersecurity' terminology. These correspond to Hansson's descriptive and normative uses, respectively. Cybersecurity p is the term that describes the activity-the practice-of cybersecurity. By contrast, cybersecurity s is the term that captures the ''normative element,'' the ''fundamental meaning'' of the term 'cybersecurity,' in terms of the discipline's properties and whether they qualify the practice of cybersecurity as scientific. Accordingly, by distinguishing the two uses, we are in position to put that distinction to work by using cybersecurity s to analyze cybersecurity p . The remainder of this section takes the first steps-but only the first stepsdown that path.
It is worth considering the scientific status of cybersecurity p because understanding that status can guide our expectations about the evolution of the field and the results we hope to achieve via cybersecurity p . Indeed, perhaps the impetus behind the recent urgency to establish cybersecurity s is the fear that cybersecurity p could end up being pseudoscientific. This is the first clue that cybersecurity p is protoscientific: those who are pioneering the cybersecurity s literature raise concerns that cybersecurity p exhibits traits that are symptoms of a pseudoscience. For example, nearly all calls for the development of a ''science of cybersecurity'' cite the present lack of predictive ability, the lack of repeatable results, and the need to resort to reacting to attacks (rather than the ability to anticipate them) that pervade cybersecurity p :
We need a science of cybersecurity [emphasis in the original] that puts the construction of secure systems onto a firm foundation by giving developers a body of laws for predicting the consequences of design and implementation choices (Schneider, 12 p. 47).
In cyber security we also need measurements that are dependable and error-free; undependable measurements make for undependable values and analyses, and for invalid conclusions. A rigorous experimental methodology will help ensure that measurements are valid, leading to outcomes in which we can have confidence (Maxion, 11 p. 344).
These claims suggest a concern that cybersecurity p is pseudoscientific. This would cast cybersecurity p with the same lot, for example, as astrology, climate change denial, and psychokinesis. Those pseudosciences present sparse and uncontrolled evidence for their claims, fail under comprehensive scrutiny, lack metrics for accurate measurement, and are unable to generate the reliable predictive claims that legitimate sciences are capable of generating. Some of those qualities appear to be applicable to cybersecurity p presently.
To characterize these concerns a bit more formally, we return to the work of Hansson. Hansson advances, through extended analysis, the following definition for 'pseudoscience': ''A phenomenon is pseudo-scientific if and only if it belongs to a doctrine such that: (1) the doctrine is not scientific, and (2) major proponents of the doctrine try to create the impression that it is scientific.'' (Hansson, 20 p. 174). xv Because Hansson defines 'pseudoscience' in terms of 'science,' a proper application of his definition requires the deployment of a definition for 'science.' This is where Kott's definition of 'science' re-enters the discussion: insofar as science involves a collection or family of models, a pseudoscience is a movement such that: (1) it does not involve well-established models; and (2) the proponents of the movement try to create the impression that its models are well-established. xvi Thus, cybersecurity p can avoid a pseudoscientific fate so long as: (1) it involves well-established models; or (2) its proponents do not illegitimately aim to create the impression that its models are well-established. A case can be made that neither disjunct is overwhelmingly satisfied at this point in the development of cybersecurity p .
Concerning (1), cybersecurity p has not yet reached a state where its models are well-established. Indeed, a driving motivation for this special issue is to investigate the very utility of models and their use in cybersecurity p . Finer features of the models that Kott deems worthy to generate a scientific cybersecurity p include the requirements that the models:
• Are expressed in an appropriate rigorous formalism; • Explicitly specify assumptions, simplifications and constraints; • Involve characteristics of threats, defensive mechanisms, and the defended network; • Are at least partly theoretically grounded;
• Yield experimentally testable predictions of characteristics of security violations (Kott, 1 p. 3).
xvii The fledgling cybersecurity s work that exists directly challenges the applicability of many of the features on Kott's list to the existing models in cybersecurity p , which thereby challenges whether such models qualify as ''well-established.'' For example, Maxion et al. 21 lament the lack of transparency in cybersecurity p experimentation. Schneider 12 notes the present lack of scientific laws in cybersecurity s research, which impacts the scope of the models that can be generated for use in cybersecurity p .
Rossow et al. 22 paint a grim picture of the scientific legitimacy of experimentation in malware research. Hatleback and Spring 10 identify the difficulty of generating sound experimental design when dealing with the engineered mechanisms that are prevalent in computing. This sample of the cybersecurity s literature shows that it would be quite difficult to argue convincingly that the current models in place in cybersecurity p could be characterized as ''wellestablished''. xviii Concerning (2), the analysis is not as clear-cut. From one perspective-that of the cybersecurity s researchers-it is very clear that there are no illegitimate claims of scientificity for cybersecurity p occurring. This much is evident from the selection of the literature that was cited above, all of which identify the places in which cybersecurity p currently falls short in terms of the qualities articulated by Kott. However, one could argue that the very subset of cybersecurity p researchers who are the targets of that cybersecurity s literature are illegitimately creating the impression that their cybersecurity p models are well-founded.
ixx
To adjudicate this discrepancy, it is helpful to appeal to a unique feature of the cybersecurity field that makes an important difference. Because the cybersecurity s discipline is so nascent, its researchers are, in fact, still heavily involved in cybersecurity p . Thus, despite the presence of some cybersecurity p researchers who may be illegitimately creating the impression that the models of cybersecurity p are well-founded, it certainly is not the case that, on the whole, the proponents of cybersecurity p are doing so. In this respect, it is the cybersecurity s researchers who are shielding cybersecurity p from a potentially pseudoscientific fate.
So, where does that leave the status of cybersecurity p ? Since Hansson's (1) is satisfied, cybersecurity p is not scientific (presently). However, since Hansson's (2) is not satisfied, neither is cybersecurity p pseudoscientific (presently). Instead, cybersecurity p occupies that state identified by Popper as pre-scientific. And yet the potentiality remains that cybersecurity p is actually prepseudoscientific. To apply Popper's description, cybersecurity p exhibits techniques and practices that seem magical: extant and sometimes effective, yet not wholly manipulable nor universally deployable. Cybersecurity p is a protoscience.
Conclusions
The history of science is a story of disciplines evolving and devolving, finding success and suffering failure. The discipline of cybersecurity is now entering that story. Only hindsight yields the perspective necessary to categorize a discipline accurately. Indeed, as Kuhn observed in the work in which he first defined 'protoscience,' I claim no therapy to assist the transformation of a protoscience to a science, nor do I suppose that anything of the sort is to be had.. A sentence I once used when discussing the special efficacy of mathematical theories applies equally well here: ''As in individual development, so in the scientific group, maturity comes most surely to those who know how to wait.'' Fortunately, though no prescription will force it, the transition to maturity does come to many fields, and it is well worth waiting and struggling to attain. Each of the currently established sciences has emerged from a previously more speculative branch of natural philosophy, medicine, or the crafts at some relatively well-defined period of the past. Other fields will surely experience the same transition in the future. Only after it occurs does progress become an obvious characteristic of a field. (Kuhn, 19 p. 245)
Sometimes, even hindsight is not enough. Renaissanceera alchemy was protoscientific, yet historians remain conflicted about whether it evolved to scientific success in the form of chemistry, or whether it devolved to pseudoscientific failure in the form of a panpsychic, spiritual, or Jungian mysticism. 24 Even now, then, it is not clear whether Renaissance-era alchemy was pre-scientific or pre-pseudoscientific. And even in cases where hindsight reveals an incontrovertible pseudoscience, such as the astrology that was practiced contemporaneously with alchemy, scientific giants like Johann Kepler can be found partaking in the pseudoscience. xx At this early stage of cybersecurity research, then, it seems premature to label cybersecurity p anything but a protoscience; it is a field for which, as Kuhn would surely agree, we cannot yet judge whether its progress will become substantial enough to cross the threshold into the maturity of established science.
The adoption of a model-driven paradigm in the discipline of cybersecurity offers the opportunity for its transition to maturity, particularly if one adopts a modelbased definition for science such as the one formulated by Kott. However, for the history of science to include that story, researchers must mark the distinction between cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s . The protoscience of cybersecurity p is capable of transitioning into a science, but it will take the development of cybersecurity s to enable that transition.
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In support of his definition, Kott cites Suppes 2 and Cartwright.
3 Perhaps the most well-known attempt to solve the demarcation problem (i.e., separating science from non-science) is due to Popper, who ii.
There are, of course, even more activities beyond those listed that could be subsumed under the task of defending, such as the implementation of preventative measures (blacklists or firewalls, for example), or the identification and classification of malware. Whether any of these particular activities are the ones under consideration when we attempt to determine ''whether cybersecurity can be scientific'' is the important question at hand. In what follows, it will be argued that science of cybersecurity researchers, on a case-by-case basis, are the ones to make this determination. iii. The short list of methods, principles, and laws is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, they are examples of some of the properties of cybersecurity p under the purview of cybersecurity s . For example, a cybersecurity s researcher might investigate whether sufficient scientific rigor is embraced when undertaking cybersecurity p research. This would be an investigation of the methods of cybersecurity p . Likewise, the cybersecurity s researcher might examine the operating assumptions that cybersecurity p research exhibits concerning the behavior of adversaries. This would be an investigation of the principles of cybersecurity p . And, to complete the set of examples, the cybersecurity s researcher might investigate the consistency of scientific laws that might emerge from the work of cybersecurity p researchers. Such work would address the implications of potential scientific laws of cybersecurity p . iv. Alas, since a non-negligible portion of the field already uses the label ''science of cybersecurity'' to refer to research of this sort, attempts to establish ''philosophy of cybersecurity'' as a replacement name for it are unlikely to succeed. Despite this quandary, it is possible that some replacement label will take root for cybersecurity s , owing to the unlikelihood that the two placeholders in use here (cybersecurity p and cybersecurity s ) will emerge as established names for the two types of research. v.
We would need to be careful, of course, to define science explicitly in order to make this evaluative claim. For example, if we were to adopt Kott's definition for science that was quoted in Section 1, then we would assess whether the cybersecurity p researcher acts in accordance with the methodology that underwrites the collection of models or the family of models designated as the defining class for the science. If so, then the cybersecurity p researcher would be acting scientifically, and if not, then he or she would be acting unscientifically. vi. I wish to thank the anonymous referees for bringing these two important points to my attention. vii. See Schiaffonati and Verdicchio, 9 especially Section 1 (and the references therein), for a good introductory survey of the various angles involved in the ''engineering versus science'' discussion that arises when trying to classify the computing discipline.
viii. For more on the dynamic environment faced by cybersecurity p researchers, see Hatleback and Spring, 10 where such environments are characterized as containing engineered mechanisms. ix. As suggested previously, this consequence could be due to the unique adversarial nature of cybersecurity p . The result is that the activity of producing universal laws falls not to the cybersecurity p researchers (as might be the case in other traditional sciences), but instead to the cybersecurity s researchers. x.
The usage of ''protoscience'' in this work follows the lead generated (in part) by Popper (in the cited quote), which is explicitly coined ''protoscience'' later, by Kuhn is partly for accessibility and partly for its coherence with the narrative being developed: the views of Popper and Kott are similar in their reliance on controlled empirical observation. See note xvi for further discussion of this. xiii. There are other developmental possibilities beyond the transitions to science and pseudoscience. For example, a discipline could develop into theism (where the practice eschews the physical for the supernatural), or it could develop into formalism (where the practice eschews the physical for the logical or mathematical). But, in terms of the scope of the present argument, the relevant alternatives in the cybersecurity case are science and pseudoscience. xiv. The classification of the scientific development of cybersecurity p falls under the domain of philosophy of science in a general sense. In a specific sense, the task falls to cybersecurity s . This is akin, for example, to the evaluation of the experimental methodology of cellular biologists: such an evaluation falls under the general domain of philosophy of science, even though it would be the philosophers of biology in particular that would undertake the evaluation. xv. Hansson actually presents a further-developed definition for pseudoscience on page 175, but he ultimately reverts to supporting the quoted definition after realizing that thefurther-developed definition ''is such a far cry from the etymological definition that it is doubtful whether it should be adopted.'' Also: although Hansson hyphenates ''pseudo-science,'' I will maintain the now-standard nonhyphenated spelling for the remainder of this discussion (except in quotations, where I will maintain the author's original spelling). xvi. The adoption of Kott's particular definition for 'science' may appear arbitrary. Indeed, any chosen definition for 'science' is arbitrary if it is not accompanied by argumentation that justifies it. In this case, Kott's starting point is justifiable because it falls under a class of definitions that rely on controlled empirical observation as the crucial feature, which is one of the most wide-ranging features among the various means of defining 'science.' For example, Popper's falsifiability criterion also is tethered to controlled empirical observation. In this respect, Kott's definition is interchangeable in my argument with any definition that likewise relies on that feature. xvii. Kott's list is numbered, but I have removed the numbers to avoid confusion in the present discussion. xviii. I do not intend to imply that there a no models generated by cybersecurity p that are well-established. For example, the Kill Chain model presented in Hutchins et al. 23 appears to be well-established according to the criteria delineated on Kott's list. ixx. Rossow et al. 22 is a particularly good starting place for identifying cybersecurity p researchers who illegitimately give the impression that their work in cybersecurity p is scientifically grounded. xx. See, for example, Kepler's Concerning the more certain fundamentals of astrology, 25 which was originally published in 1601.
